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Vice, Universe, and Everything
Lisa Silver*

I. INTRODUCTION
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc.,1 is a notable decision despite the fact
that the substantive issue, production orders in the journalistic source
context, is now governed by a new statutory regime.2 Vice Media bristles
with legal energy and it is for this reason the decision is worth exploring.
As readers of the law, through Vice Media, we become witnesses to the
edgy unpredictable side of criminal law as the vagaries of street-level life
intersects with the rule of law. This jumble of real-time issues is
constrained in Vice Media, through an application of principled and
balanced ideals. Yet, the overarching principle is surprisingly fluid and
supple. Deep within the Vice Media decision lies the embedded mantra of
the Supreme Court of Canada that context is everything. It is this
conceptual perspective, more than any other legal principle, which
propels legal decision-making beyond the confines of the courtroom. It is
at that very vanishing point, the point of the unseen and unknown, where
the case really shines.
In this article, we will explore the Vice Media universe and see that
context, is indeed, everything, which in turn provides the purveyor of the
law with so much more. The “more” will also be revealed in what issues
Vice Media does not directly engage. Vice Media, although a Charter
decision, does not engage in a traditional detailed Charter analysis.
Rather, the Charter is akin to the devil in the details as the hidden force
behind the contextual reasoning making the Vice Media decision
complex and layered.

*
Assistant Professor, University of Calgary, Faculty of Law. This article is based on a blog
case commentary posted on both the University of Calgary website ABlawg.ca and on my Ideablawg
website entitled, “The Vice Squad: A Case Commentary on R. v. Vice Media Inc.”.
1
[2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vice Media”].
2
Id., at para. 6. See Journalistic Sources Protection Act, S.C. 2017, c. 22 [hereinafter
“JSPA”]. See also, Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 39.1; Criminal Code of Canada,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 488.01, 488.02 [hereinafter “Code”].
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The factual matrix of the case seems rather commonplace in today’s
standards where we are constantly expecting the unexpected. In fact,
journalists regularly gather sensitive and volatile information from
hidden human sources.3 This is the stuff of smart investigative reporting
and it offers insightful but sometimes explosive reveals. Such was the
case in Vice Media. To be sure, Vice Media is a go-getter media outlet:
a newish kid on the block, who, with equal doses of style and aplomb
combined with grit and tenacity, presents stories with the urban flair
expected of an omnipresent media team. In this case, the journalistic
prize came in the form of a source who was a suspected terrorist. They
exchanged, as all sharp social media users do, a series of informative text
messages. But these were messages with a difference. The journalist, by
communicating with a suspected criminal, entered the rule-based
confines of criminal law. More than merely conversational, these
messages became potential evidence and as evidence, attracted legal
meaning and weight. The journalist investigation was instantly
transformed into a police investigation. With that transformation, the
rules of the game changed. What was driven by the written word was
instantly transported through the portals of law.
The police moved quickly to secure and preserve the information,
“under glass” so to speak, through the legal tools available. A production
order under section 487.014 of the Criminal Code4 was obtained quickly,
silently and ex parte. Production orders are the aide du camp to the
search warrant regime in the Code. When issued, they require the person
so named in the order to hand over to the police the subject document
that is in their possession or control. It is all about evidence, trial
evidence, and what kind of information is needed to prove a criminal
offence in court. With a stroke of a pen, the legal world encases the
whirly-burly world of media in a glass case. Dynamic communication is
crystallized, dryly, into documentary fact. However, this colourless coup
still has some drama left to it. In this encasement, the formalistic legal
rules must grapple with the equally formalistic journalistic rules. In Vice
Media, legal principles run up against another as journalistic source
privilege creates an impasse. It is up to the Supreme Court to reconsider
the legal and journalistic landscape.
In the end, the Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts by
upholding the presence of the law as the paramount concern in this media
3
4

Vice Media, id., at para. 127, Abella J., concurring.
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 488.01, 488.02.
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story. The production is properly issued and must be obeyed. But this
story does not go out with a whimper but a bang as the Court, though in
agreement in the result, does not agree in how they get there. This is truly
the excitement and energy of the Vice Media legal landscape as two
opinions on the issue emerge. The majority, hanging onto the creation of
law by the slim agreement of five, is written by Moldaver J., the criminal
law heavyweight on the Court. Justice Moldaver is an experienced
criminal lawyer and approaches the decision with his usual hardboiled
common sense. The concurring minority decision of four, is written by
Abella J. with her innate sense of the human condition. The setting could
not be better for a decision on the realities of the urban scene.
I have already identified the thematic presence of context in this
decision. Contextualization as the foundational garment protecting the
analytical layers of the case gives the decision cohesiveness and weight.
However, over and above this foundation are three intersecting issues
influencing the outcome of both the majority and minority positions. The
first, involves the continuing utility of the Lessard5 framework and the
applicable standard of review. The second, engages Charter values as
bundled into section 2(b)6 as the unique signature of media societal
purpose. The third and final matter, which creates the tension-filled
atmosphere of this decision, is the overlay of journalistic confidential
source privilege as it runs headlong into the public interest in
maintaining a safe community.
If the contextual approach acts as a unifying concept for this decision,
then the manifestation of Charter rights, not merely Charter values,
provides the bright line between the majority and minority decisions. In
Part V of the article, it is the intensely different perspectives between the
majority and the minority on the value of the Charter in the contextual
approach to the matter which matters. The final issue, then, is whether
the Charter, as reflected in the purpose of media, is merely the backdrop
to the Lessard application as found by the majority or, whether, as
suggested by the concurring decision, Charter rights are the primary
mover of what is at stake in Vice Media. The focus in this article will be
the opening prospect of Abella J.’s position that time, social context, and

5
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (CBC) v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
421, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 517 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lessard”].
6
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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need, demand the Court explicitly recognize the value of media Charter
rights through a re-imagining of the Lessard test.7
It is the confluence of these issues, which create, in Vice Media, a
game-changing case despite the façade of mootness resulting from the
new legislation. Vice Media is a worthy decision to contemplate not only
for its pure legalistic value but also as an exemplar of the Supreme Court
of Canada’s modern approach to criminal law. A modern contextual
approach, which, when applied, provides multiple platforms for differing
visions of how the Charter expresses itself, either as a backdrop to more
muscular criminal law and evidentiary issues, or as the ultimate driver of
the fundamental values of Canadian society.

II. THE LESSARD FRAMEWORK
Justice Moldaver opens with the obvious in paragraph 1 of the
decision. There is an analytical framework, found in the 1991 decision in
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard,8 to decide the issue. As an
aside, the framework, pulling no punches here, involves the balancing of
“two competing concepts: the state’s interest in the investigation and
prosecution of crime, and the media’s right to privacy in gathering and
disseminating the news.”9 The issue here, however, does surprise. It is
not a “business as usual” question, involving the application of that longstanding framework, but involves a deeper question asking whether the
framework is actually workable. The law can create but, so the argument
goes, the law must be useable. Principles may be lofty and imbued with
high-minded values, but they must work on the street-level as well. What
is said in Ottawa must be later applied in small-town Dundas, Ontario or
main street Nelson, British Columbia. If it can’t work there, it’s of no
use, legally or otherwise.
Does that balance work? The majority believes it does with some
refinement. Tweaking has become the new tweeting at the Supreme
Court level. Justice Moldaver suggests just such a quick fix by importing
a case-by-case analysis that permits a less mechanical application of
rules and by “reorganizing” the applicable Lessard factors. But then, and
7

(S.C.C.).

R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at paras. 122-123

8
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (CBC) v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
421, 67 CCC (3d) 517 (S.C.C.).
9
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at paras. 1, 127
(S.C.C.).
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here is where a tweak looks more like a redo, the majority offers a
modified standard of review (SOR). The spectre of SOR runs deep in the
Supreme Court of Canada decision-making psyche. Indeed, Twitter
chatter has been incessant on the interminable SOR debacle residing in
administrative law10 as exemplified and amplified in the Dunsmuir11
decision. The SOR-like debate rearing its head here, of all places, gives
Vice Media a further sharpness of purpose. By engaging and thereby
changing the standard of review applied to the issuance of media
production in the ex parte context, the majority, under the steady helm of
Moldaver J., is modifying an icon of warrant oversight and review,
namely, the Garofoli12 application.
First, however, Moldaver J., loosens the Lessard hold by making
allowances for both the realities of the business of media and the exercise
of judicial discretion. Both of these concessions are modern in aspect and
approach. The first concession, to the realities of media operation,
recognizes that in the modern age, media bits travel as fast as bytes. As
quickly as the journalist in Vice Media gathered the information from the
source, that same information can be pushed out into the media universe.
To build into the Lessard inquiry the advent of the modern age is to
create a more flexible response to media life. Thus, partial publication
does not rule the Lessard rule but softens it into the Vice Media factors.
However, to ensure the sharpness of what makes a rule of law, Moldaver
J. places this partial publication factor into the application judge’s hands
as part of the overall “delicate”13 balancing act. The primary position of
the judge who sees and hears the application first hand is preserved. This
muscling up or enhancement of the gatekeeper role of the trial judge is a
recurrent theme in the Supreme Court. Vice Media is a continuation of
this shoring up of the trial judge as the front line of justice.
The Supreme Court penchant for characterizing the role of the frontline judge as the protector of the integrity of the justice system through
the gatekeeper function is realized, without a scintilla of doubt, through
the majority’s injection into the Lessard balancing a consideration of the
10

See, e.g., Martin Olszynski, “For the admin law types, this post follows up on some
thinking re: standard of review from a couple weeks back.”, (December 13, 2017, at 14:05),
online: Twitter, <https://twitter.com/molszyns/status/941066540417409027>.
11
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.). See also,
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 31,
2018 SCC 31 (S.C.C.).
12
R. v. Garofoli, [1990] S.C.J. No. 115, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Garofoli”].
13
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 13 (S.C.C.).
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probative value of the information. This element involves the
“informativeness”14 of the information obtained by the informer. To
consider and measure the cogency or strength of the information at issue
is completely consistent with Moldaver J.’s view of the special place
probative value has in a judge’s discretionary decision-making. In
previous re-fashioning of other tests, Moldaver J. has turned to the
probative value of the evidence such as in the enhanced confession/abuse
of process test created in Hart.15
Probative value is not, however, an absolute concept but involves
relationships or connections between evidence. In fact, the probative
value or weight given to evidence must be viewed in the context of the
whole case. This explains why Moldaver J. positions the probative value
of the protected evidence as a consideration in determining whether the
evidence should be accessed by the State.16 Probative value is “a”
consideration, not a stand-alone Lessard factor, as the production order is
only part of the investigatory stage. It would be premature to place too
much weight on probative value at such an anticipatory stage, before the
entire case is yet to unfold.
Yet, considering the transient concept of probative value in light of
the tentativeness of the information at issue in the production phase, any
reliance on the informativeness of the information to be accessed is
speculative at best. This is where the probative value must then be
assessed in turn on its reliability. This injection of a threshold reliability
factor draws from another contentious Supreme Court decision in R. v.
Bradshaw.17 In Bradshaw, the evidential version of the Clash of the
Titans, the Court wrestled with the interplay of traditional and modern
approaches to evidence with the majority leaning on threshold reliability
as the mechanism to pin down the swirling principles in play. Reliability
is also the banner of probative value and is used in Vice Media to similar
effect as in Bradshaw to give the gatekeeper something concrete upon
which to hang the issuance of the warrant.
This leads logically to Moldaver J.’s further caution that probative
value should not be dictated by hard evidential rules. Again, contextually
and functionally this would be contrary to common sense. A production
order or a search warrant is at the infancy of a case. These are
14
David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 7th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law
Inc., 2015), at 36.
15
R. v. Hart, [2014] S.C.J. No. 52, 2014 SCC 52 (S.C.C.).
16
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 56 (S.C.C.).
17
[2017] S.C.J. No. 35, 2017 SCC 35 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bradshaw”].
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investigatory tools albeit tools which may lead to trial. The information
to be accessed are facts not evidence. They have not been filtered
through the legal rules engaged at trial. They are, as earlier stated,
anticipatory. Therefore, Moldaver J. declines to import reliability’s
partner in crime, Wigmore’s necessity requirement, into the assessment.18
Still, by permitting probative value as an overarching factor, the Court
is scaffolding evidential concepts onto the investigatory assessment.
Probative value is considered in issuing an investigatory tool, probative
value is weighed against prejudicial effect in determining admissibility of
evidence at trial, and, finally, probative value is weighed in light of the
whole of the evidence to determine whether the State has proven the
accused person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As the standard of
proof increases, how much that probative value matters will also
increase.
This then is perhaps the wild-card addition to the Lessard factors
turning the Lessard balancing into something more familiar — the
general exclusionary discretion permitting the judge as gatekeeper to
exclude evidence on the basis that the prejudicial effect of admitting the
evidence outweighs the probative value of excluding. In this warrant
issuance matrix, the discretion becomes, not the exclusion of otherwise
relevant and material evidence per se but becomes the issuance or nonissuance of a warrant which will potentially gather relevant and material
evidence for trial. The balancing of “the state’s interest in the
investigation and prosecution of crime, and the media’s right to privacy
in gathering and disseminating the news”19 is not done in a vacuum but
in the context of the probative value of the information, which may
enhance the state’s interests or not.
Finally, the Supreme Court takes the newly improved Lessard
balancing and finds the SOR to match. The ubiquitous Garofoli SOR
runs like a refrain through search warrant review. It has held through the
test of time and preserves the hierarchical judicial review process by
rigidly maintaining the boundaries between in-time originating decisionmaking and the subsequent review-generated decisions duly imbued with
hindsight. Garofoli focuses the reviewing judge on the range of
reasonable outcomes or the end-game. Unlike the issuing court, the
reviewing court does not have an eye to the unfolding of the evidence to
which the legal principles are then applied. So why the modification to
18
19

Id., paras. 52-58.
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 1 (S.C.C.).
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the time-honoured standard? The answer can be found in that elusive
media factor as discussed under Part III of this Vice Media discourse. As
a hint to what is to come, the modification of the SOR is the concession
the majority makes for Vice Media’s section 2(b) Charter rights.
Before leaving how the Court manipulated the Lessard framework,
there is a side-bar comment to make on this decision. It is the “headnote
factor”. Consistent with the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada
cases are structured, the Vice Media decision creates under the authoring
justice a list of cases found in their decision. Often, the cases are grouped
in accordance with how the case is used in the decision. For instance,
cases may be “applied” or merely “considered”.20 They can also be
“distinguished” or simply “referred to”.21 Sometimes there are no labels
attached to the line of cases mentioned.22 In Vice Media, Moldaver J.
“modified” Lessard. This label stands in stark relief to other Supreme
Court decisions providing alternate views to long-held case principles. In
Bedford,23 for example, the Reference24 decision is “referred to”.25 Even
in R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,26 where the Court clearly modifies
the RJR-MacDonald test for interlocutory injunction, the Court
“applied”27 the RJR-MacDonald28 decision. Similarly, in the reimagining of unreasonable delay, R. v. Jordan29 “overruled”30 R. v.
Morin.31 It is difficult not to read too much into this innocuous labelling,
but it seems the Court is signalling to the reader that Lessard is not the
gold standard decision it once was and now there is the Vice Media
framework in its place. Interestingly, Garofoli is merely “applied”32 in
Vice Media with no hint it was modified to capture the media factor.

20

See, e.g., R. v. Bird, [2019] S.C.J. No. 7, 2019 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) (cases cited by Moldaver J.).
Id.
22
See, e.g., R. v. Calnen, [2019] S.C.J. No. 6, 2019 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) (cases cited by Martin J.).
23
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Bedford”].
24
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.).
25
R. v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72 (S.C.C.) (cases cited).
26
R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [2018] S.C.J. No. 5, 2018 SCC 5 (S.C.C.).
27
Id. (case cited).
28
RJR–MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] S.C.J. No. 17, [1994] 1
S.C.R. 311, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
29
[2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.).
30
Id. (case cited by Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ.).
31
[1992] S.C.J. No. 25, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
32
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53 (case cited by
Moldaver J.).
21
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III. THE MEDIA FACTOR
Before we take on this part of the decision, we need a feel for the
atmosphere. We are under the aegis of section 2(b) of the Charter and in
the heightened environs of “the special status accorded to the media.”33
Freedom of expression, in the form of media expression quoting the
dissent of McLachlin J., as she then was, in Lessard, is more than the
pure “pursuit of truth.”34 Rather, it reflects the “values” of truth.35
Freedom of the press is an expression of, and an act of, community. This
dimension to media Charter rights particularly resonates in the Trump
infused universe of parallel facts and fake news. It also resonates with
Abella J.’s perspective as articulated in her concurring judgment. In her
view, “a vigorous, rigorous, and independent press holds people and
institutions to account, uncovers the truth, and informs the public.”36
According to Abella J., the press is society’s agent, not the
government’s agent. Their actions give meaning to “expression” but also
to “freedom”. As such, the press is vital “to the functioning of our
democracy.”37 But, spoiler alert, the gravitas of this sentiment differs as
between the majority and the minority in Vice Media. It is this difference
in contextual perspective, which I suggest drives the decisions in this
case more than anything else. In any event, Lessard, impresses section
2(b) with the stamp of vitality promised by section 2(b). It involves a
boisterous labour action at a post office, the bread and butter of on the
ground media reporting. The crowd was video-recorded, and the police
needed the recording as evidence for a criminal prosecution. In contrast,
the facts in Vice Media, touch upon democracy’s innermost fear of
terrorist activity.
Justice Moldaver’s majority analysis appears to observe this
atmosphere through the encased glass of the production order.
Channelling Cory J. in Lessard’s companion case, Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General),38 Moldaver J.
sees the section 2(b) Charter rights as wallpaper or “backdrop”, giving
contextual meaning to the reasonableness of the search as authorized by
33

Id., at para. 14.
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (CBC) v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R
421, at 451, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 517 (S.C.C.).
35
Id.
36
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 125 (S.C.C.).
37
Id.
38
[1991] S.C.J. No. 88, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459, 85 D.L.R. (4th) 57 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “New
Brunswick”].
34
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the warrants. This perspective turns Charter dialogue on its head by
transforming the robust Charter rights that figure prominently in media
expression under section 2(b) into the subtler cousin as described by
Charter values. In doing so, the majority is not so much concerned with a
well-defined section 2(b) Charter analysis as the informational content of
that right. The majority contextualizes Charter content instead of
applying Charter rights as the yardstick for measurement in assessing the
viability of the search. Certainly, the search focus is Charter-oriented, but
the section 8 perspective is not section 2(b) heavy. Returning to the
balancing in Vice Media of “two competing concepts: the state’s interest
in the investigation and prosecution of crime, and the media’s right to
privacy in gathering and disseminating the news”,39 section 8’s concern
with privacy rights protection is coloured by the purpose of media
expression. This dabbing of colour tints the section 8 analysis but does
not overpower.
It is not only Lessard and New Brunswick, which suggest this Charter
backdrop approach. Justice Binnie, in the majority for National Post,40
continues this redecoration. The National Post decision figures
prominently in the majority analysis as a decision facing a similar matrix
of issues as in Vice Media.41 Notably, Abella J. is the lone dissenter in
National Post. In National Post, Binnie J. makes it perfectly clear where
the line is drawn before the balancing occurs when he opens his
judgment stating, that “The public has the right to every person’s
evidence.”42 Not just any evidence, mind, as this is “physical”43
evidence. Physical evidence of a crime is the controlling issue. Although
the court must “strive to uphold the special position of the media”,44 that
specialness does not overcome the physicality and informativeness of the
evidence being sought even if that information was given in the context
of a confidential relationship. The specialness of physical evidence is, in
traditional section 8 case law, an important factor in admitting evidence
illegally obtained through a Charter breach. By the majority relying on
National Post, there is no surprise that Abella J.’s decision in Vice Media
sees and seizes an opportunity for a National Post redo. Indeed, the time
39
40

R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 1 (S.C.C.).
R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, 2010 SCC 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National

Post”].

41
42
43
44

Id., at para. 19.
Id., at para. 1.
Id., at para. 3.
Id.
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is ripe for a freshening up of the entire line of cases from the 1991
Lessard to now considering the paradigm shift of our conception of
privacy and the aspirational dimension of section 24(2) found in recent
Supreme Court cases. The effect of this shift will be discussed later in
this article when section 8 privacy rights in the Charter receives the top
by-line. For the time however, the Charter performs a mere contextual
purpose, like the palette upon which the tints are mixed before
application.
The actual dabbing of Charter colour takes place, as hinted at earlier,
through the modification of Garofoli for this specific situation.
Interestingly, the reasoning for the change is not really Charter rights or
Charter values but the “highly deferential”45 SOR envisioned by
Garofoli. For the Supreme Court, the standard of review is to the
reviewing court like provenance is to art museums. No one can really
rely on the reviewing court’s decision unless there is agreement on the
standard by which that original decision is assessed. The standard of
reviewing the issuance of an investigatory order was determined almost
30 years ago in Garofoli. There, Sopinka J. clarified the review was not a
de novo assessment in which the reviewing court simply substituted their
opinion. Rather, it is an assessment as seen through the eyes of the
issuing judge, looking at the information before the judge at the time but
with the benefit of any acceptable amplification on review. This test has
parallels with the air of reality test, a threshold test used to determine
whether a defence is “in play” and can be considered by the trier of fact.
The air of reality test requires a consideration of whether a jury properly
instructed and acting reasonably could acquit on the evidence. With a
review of an issuing judge’s decision, the review court asks whether
“there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the
basis of which the authorization could have issued”.46
Despite Moldaver J.’s view that Garofoli is a “highly deferential” test,
there is wriggle room for the reviewing court through amplification on
review. Additionally, the view through the eyes of the issuing judge is,
here it is again, contextualized by the evidence before the reviewing
judge. For instance, the reviewing judge can consider an application to
cross-examine the affiant of the Information To Obtain as part of its
review. If permitted, the evidence may provide further context to the
original basis for the authorization. The difficulty with this approach,
45
46

R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 72 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 69.
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Moldaver J. notes, is where the authorizing judge issues process ex parte
with only the State providing the grounds for such authorization.
Warrants and investigatory orders are typically issued in an ex parte
manner. The real difference in the Vice Media scenario is the inability for
the media outlet to argue, at the time of authorization, against issuance
on the basis of section 2(b) of the Charter. They can argue this upon
review, but then the standard of review is no longer de novo but on the
basis of Garofoli.
The review involves determining not what the issuing judge should
have done but could have done. Permissive and not imperative in aspect.
To keep state intrusions within the scope required by Lessard, the SOR
must lay in the shades between the imperative and permissive. In other
words, the review does not command one way but permits a range of
perspectives. Justice Moldaver changes the soft focus of the Garofoli
exercise into a well-defined re-trial of the issue depending on the context.
This contextual approach recalibrates the Garofoli application and
switches the reviewer’s focus and permissive role to the starting point
where, sitting in the place of the issuing judge, the reviewer morphs into
the commanding voice as the hearer ab initio of a de novo review.47 Here
too, context is everything as a de novo review is conducted where a
material change in circumstances, which was not before the issuing
judge, “could reasonably have affected” the issuance order.
If the issuing hearing was ex parte, as they typically are, without the
media presence, then the test for de novo review is similar to the test for
a de novo bail review under sections 520 and 521 of the Criminal Code.48
Otherwise, the traditional Garofoli review on the record as amplified will
be the SOR. The modification is well-defined and confined through
Moldaver J.’s test. But here too tradition gets the tint treatment. Justice
Moldaver contextualizes the Garofoli review by insisting that reviewing
judges should give “special consideration”49 to the backdrop. That
backdrop is not written in section 2(b) rights but is summed up as “the
vital role of the media in a free and democratic society”.50 Context is an
answer to Charter rights in the Vice Media backstory.

47
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IV. THE CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE DIFFERENCE
Vice Media is not just about accessing media information to assist in
the investigation of crime, it is also about the source of that information
in the guise of a confidential informant or CI, who also happens to be the
potential suspect. The law of privilege is an evidential oddity as it serves
to exclude evidence which would otherwise be relevant and admissible in
a criminal case. Through the protections afforded by privilege, the
identity of a CI is confidential. This in turn promotes relationships in
which vital information is exchanged. A CI is more apt to divulge
information to a journalist with the knowledge there will be no adverse
repercussions as a result. The kind of adverse repercussions as in Vice,
where the information is used against the CI in a criminal investigation.
This kind of privileged communication within a journalist relationship is
not absolute and is subject to judicial discretion. Even so, the
CI/journalist relationship adds an edginess to the issue.
CIs are protected in their relationship with law enforcement but in
divulging information to the media, CIs risk disclosure. Gone is the
direct linkage between incentivizing information which assists in the
detection of crime. Media outlets are not looking to protect the public in
the strict meaning of that phrase. The police motto “to protect and serve”
is not the media’s slant “to serve by informing”. This diminished
capacity to incentivize informers to “do the right thing” and assist
investigations results in the diminished protection afforded to CI-media
relationships. Instead of a near absolute class privilege, CI-media
relationships are not presumptively protected but considered on the basis
of case-by-case privilege applying the Wigmore criteria. Justice Binnie in
National Post founded his reasoning for case-by-case privilege on a
different basis — the public right to know,51 which, with perfect
symmetry, circles back to the objective of media to inform. Justice
Binnie’s reasoning also involves a back-handed vision of section 2(b)
expression rights composed of the right of media expression together
with the right of readers of that expression.52 The reader of media, in the
National Post world, has a right to know who the journalistic source is
particularly when that person is a suspected criminal.

51
R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, 2010 SCC 16, at para. 28 (S.C.C.); see also
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 125.
52
National Post, id.
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Before we leave the CI behind in the knowledge they may or may not
be exposed when speaking to media, a word must be said on the potential
“chilling effect” factor in this case-by-case, come as you are, possibly
privileged scenario. The fact sources may “dry up”, according to
Moldaver J., does not lead to a presumption that there will be a chilling
effect should the warrant issue. Again, such a possibility may, in the
appropriate case, matter but such an effect will not be presumed by the
issuing court. This position is very consistent with another Binnie J.
decision in R. v. Spence.53 In that case, judicial notice of racial partiality
for purposes of a jury selection challenge for cause application was in
issue. In explaining how the taking of judicial notice of a fact may vary
depending on how close the fact is to the dispositive issue in the case,
Binnie J. referenced judicial notice of the chilling effect on media should
the confidential source be revealed.54 In some circumstances, Binnie J.
opined, such effect could be subject to judicial notice but where the
chilling effect fact is bound up with a section 2(b) Charter violation
argument, evidence of that fact should be called.55 As Moldaver J.
suggests in Vice Media, “context is crucial”.56

V. THE MANIFESTATION OF CHARTER RIGHTS IN THE
MINORITY DECISION
All of this tweaking may be meaningless considering the revisions to
the Code itself now providing for the special case scenario of journalistic
sources and specifically those sources arising in a national security
context. Yet, the Vice Media decision goes beyond parliamentary intent.
Indeed, the minority decision of Abella J. does just that. Her legal world
view is not suggestive of the common sense approach of the majority
decision. Instead, Abella J. calls out the majority by emphasizing the
invisible undercurrent of the majority decision which resides in the
Charter and the sanctity of the freedom of the press. Tweaking won’t do
for the minority here, but action. The level of action is up in the blue sky.
The minority decision reminds us of what is at risk when we diminish the
freedom of the press to the margins. It also reflects the current conflicts
we see in the world today.
53
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But all concurring decisions worth reading flow from a solid majority
decision. In this case, it is the majority’s reaction to the minority
position, which creates the bright line between the two decisions. In
effect, the majority decision creates a dissent-like feel to the concurring
judgment. Justice Moldaver does this by responding to the minority in a
few paragraphs at the end of his decision.57 He nicely summarizes and
thereby emphasizes the bright line drawn between the majority and the
minority by describing “my colleague’s approach, which treats this case
as an opportunity to formally recognize that freedom of the press enjoys
‘distinct and independent constitutional protection under section 2(b) of
the Charter’.”58 Indeed. The minority draws the Charter out of the
majority wrought backdrop and into the concurring judgment’s forefront.
The Charter, in the minority’s hands, becomes the binding influence of
the decision not just the delicate handiwork as envisioned by the majority
and as suggested by tradition. This, in the minority’s view, is a Charter
case not criminal law. And there lies the division between the two views.
Justice Moldaver in the response makes this division clear and leans
on another trope recently used to argue against opening the Charter door
too wide; the issue has not been “fully argued by the parties or
considered by the courts below.”59 This was also the concern in Reeves.60
Yet, not having the benefit of a full argument or, for that matter, any
argument, has not stopped the courts before. For instance, in R. v. Mian,61
the Court emphatically recognized an appellate court’s authority to
“invite submissions on an issue neither party has raised.”62 Justice
Moldaver is also loathe to enter into the section 2(b) realm without full
argument considering the “proposed recognition may have unforeseen
consequences” on other related areas such as “freedom of information
requests,” and “publication bans” to name a few.63 This justification for
not going where the minority, with eyes wide open, has clearly gone
obscures the real concern. It is not, as suggested by Moldaver J., that the
57
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courts have not previously considered media rights in light of the
gathering of information as National Post clearly does so. Similarly,
media section 2(b) rights have previously been considered by the
Supreme Court in a number of publication ban cases,64 all of which were
specifically cited in Abella J.’s minority decision.65
The real reason for not “formally”66 recognizing the “distinct and
independent”67 constitutional dimensions of press expression is based
simply on precedent. The precedent relied on by Moldaver J. involves the
self-same series of “established”68 cases, in which the majority
marginalizes Charter rights to the edges instead of using the Charter as
the controlling issue. It is this perspective that labels the Charter as a
non-starter. Precedent has a chilling effect as it both dismisses the
Charter until it is fully argued and affirms the issue as essentially nonCharter. This effect on the Vice Media decision is perfectly clear as, in
paragraph 104, Moldaver J. uses Lessard to firmly shut the door on the
Charter as an unnecessary venture. The issue is decidedly within the
Lessard universe and there too shall Vice Media remain.
The final comment made by Moldaver J. again reveals a decided
preference for the Binnie J. approach in National Post from a decade
earlier.69 In an attempt to diffuse the Charter engagement issue, Moldaver
J. uses Charter language to confirm the centrality of the media “in a free
and democratic society.”70 Even so, according to Moldaver J., the
philosophical underpinnings of media — the ultimate purpose and use of
media as envisioned by the Charter — is merely the backdrop to what is,
in essentials, a criminal law concern. The “distinct and independent”71
Charter media rights under section 2(b) will need to wait in the wings
until the right case comes around. The issue is not dismissed, it simply
does not arise.
I pause to reflect on the heading for this part of the article. In the
introduction I suggest that the interplay of three prominent issues arising
64
See Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 2,
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Canada (Attorney General), [2010] S.C.J. No. 41, 2010 SCC 41 (S.C.C.).
65
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in the decision — the Lessard framework for issuing the warrant, the
media factor, and the presence of confidential source principles — drive
this decision toward a conclusion. I also suggest that the contextual
approach to these three issues manifest in Charter rights. Yet, thus far
under this heading, the discussion is firmly fixed in one right, the section
2(b) expression rights as expressive of the raison d’etre of media. But
not so for the minority. There is a discernible movement or Charter flow
detected there. A review of Abella J.’s decision, on behalf of the three
other concurring justices, will explain how the Charter flow works.
Section 2(b) rights become the bridge beneath the minority’s feet, and
that bridge leads to privacy rights.
For Abella J., the time is “ripe”,72 indeed long overdue, for a new
world view that provides for a robust and independent freedom of the
press in section 2(b) of the Charter. This requires filling in the phrase
“freedom of the press” with “distinct constitutional content”.73 Justice
Abella’s “call to arms”, so to speak, vibrates with action driving the
minority to a collision course with the status quo found in National Post
and as reiterated in Moldaver J.’s majority. The collision is in the
direness of this recognition. Justice Abella, fully answerable to global
concerns with media attacks and fake news claims, plants the minority
firmly in the democratic ideals that provide the filler for the phrase
“freedom of the press”.74 Democracy is the “distinct constitutional
content” of freedom of the press. It provides meaning and context to the
entire case and must be recognized as the life-blood of the decision.
Logically flowing from such recognition is the need to change the
Lessard framework to fulfil this new world vision. Not only is this
change required due to the enhanced delineation of media section 2(b)
rights but is also required by the potential violation of the media’s section
8 privacy rights. Privacy rights, through recent Supreme Court decisions,
some before the release of Vice Media, as in Marakah75 and Jones,76 and
some after, as in Reeves77 and Jarvis,78 have been enhanced and
emboldened by the social landscape. They too matter in the application
of Lessard.
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Notably, the majority and minority not only use the Charter to
different effect in their judgments, but they also proffer differing
interpretations of the phrase “protection of the public”. Justice Moldaver
sees a balanced contextual approach to ensure the investigation and
detection of crime for a safe society. This concept of “protection of the
public” is a familiar one. It runs thread-like through section 8 case law,79
it runs through confidential informer case law,80 and it runs through
Lessard and National Post. Conversely, Abella J. takes an expansive
view of “protection of the public” through a “vigorous protection”81 of
the press. The media is the public and the public is the media.82 If the law
cannot provide protection through “[s]trong constitutional safeguards”,83
then the media, and thus the public, cannot “perform its essential
democratic role”.84 These two entirely different views of “protection of
the public” is explicit in Vice Media but it is not a new dividing line. It
acts as the counterpoint between the majority and dissent in Fearon85 and
in Marakah.86
The protection provided for by these Charter rights requires,
according to Abella J., “... [a] rigorously protective harmonized
analysis”.87 Part of that analysis involves a robust discussion on the
scope of section 2(b) media rights, delineating between ethical
journalism and “tabloid espionage”.88 Scope not only involves the type of
journalism protected but also includes the extent of the right within those
protected areas. For example, according to Abella J., “work product”,
where the source is either known or unknown, is typically protected.89
The majority’s confidential informer concern is delicately diminished by
the minority to a non-starter when it comes to section 2(b) of the
Charter.90
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Having set out the section 2(b) parameters, Abella J. uses this bridge
of rights to fill out the fallacy introduced by Binnie J. when he
characterized the warrant issuance as a “right to everyone’s evidence”.
Rights are Charter rights. There is no Charter right to evidence. The
minority uses the Charter as the defining tool of the analysis while the
majority’s functional approach gazes at the Charter through the tools of
the state. Justice Abella turns the majority’s “protection of the public”
into a manageable state “interest”, whilst maintaining the protection of
the public’s right to know through the right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure by the state. The bridge is complete as
the privacy rights flow into the harmonized analysis. Here, the section
2(b) Charter right is not muted in the background but shines front and
centre91 necessitating that the section 8 Charter privacy right does not
stand alone in the balance.92
In this Charter-rules context, the issuing judge still balances under
this enhanced (not just tweaked) test but does so in the clear language of
the gatekeeper.93 For Abella J., the vividness of Charter rights must be
viewed with eyes wide open as the judge may issue the order only when
“satisfied that the state’s beneficial interest outweighs the harmful impact
on the press should a production order be made.”94 Notably, Abella J.
agrees with Moldaver J. on the issue of prior publication, probative value
of the evidence95 and on the standard of review.96 Essentials remain the
same, but it is the context which changes.
I suggested earlier in this article that Moldaver J. imported into the
Lessard framework a gatekeeper-like function requiring consideration of
the probative value of the information. This, in my view, creates layers of
gatekeeping that might be used to the disadvantage of the media, the
opponent to the issuance of the warrant, as an added threshold to cross.
However, this is not the approach of the minority. They would not import
this weighing into a factor to consider but would change the entire
Lessard framework into a holistic Charter imbued engine, a harmonized
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analysis, which in its entirety becomes a gatekeeper function.97 Such a
view as this, where the issuing judge is no longer merely the issuing
judge, but the gatekeeper, is profound.
The gatekeeper guardian of Charter rights and state interests must,
when weighing whether the “salutary effects of the production order
outweigh the deleterious effects”,98 treat the media as the very public
whom they serve. This analysis places media, with its heightened section
2(b) rights, in the streets of urban life as the gatekeeper considers
peoplehood issues like reasonable expectation of privacy, proportionality,
harmful effects, minimal impairment, due diligence.99 The list of factors
sounds like an amalgam of search warrant requirements, general
evidentiary exclusionary discretion, and the Oakes test,100 all wrapped up
in a Charter package. The salutary effects of the order as seen through
the state interest is tied to the seriousness of the offence in question, the
immediacy of it and the strength of the evidence sought.101 This
recitation of factors suggests a test with a high standard befitting the
Charter rights at risk.
Essentially, the concurring judgment requires the issuing judge to
consider whether issuing the order is in the interests of justice and, in the
section 24(2) of the Charter sense, whether issuance would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. Section 24(2) balancing is
aspirational, forward-looking and engages societal standards.102 It is an
apt context to view the minority’s position.

VI. THE VICE UNIVERSE WHERE CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING
In this media infused atmosphere, context is everything. That should
be no surprise to anyone who has read a Supreme Court case in the last
decade. In fact, we might say that context is not just everything, it is
royalty, as principles seem to bend to it. Case in point is the majority’s
view of the Lessard factor of prior partial publication. Under the
unrefined Lessard framework, if the information of the criminal activity
sought by the state has been disclosed publicly then seizure of that
information is warranted. Indeed, those circumstances may heighten the
97
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importance of that factor, which “will favour” the issuance of the order
or search warrant. Justice Moldaver finds the Lessard approach turns a
factor into a “decisive” one.103 Although it is arguable whether Cory J. in
Lessard would agree with that characterization of his comments,
Moldaver J.’s approach, to allow for context in assessing prior
publication by favouring a case-by-case analysis, is defensible. Again,
smoothing out the complexities through a good dose of common sensedriven principles.
Context is confirmed by Moldaver J.’s finding that Deference, in the
large sense of the term, is the true standard here. By permitting a more
contextual permissive approach, Moldaver J. opens the door to a
moveable feast of standards for review that appear tailor-made to the
situation or facts.104 Moving away from deference may be fairer but it
also creates a non-linear hierarchy within the issuance of such orders. It
also replaces deference with the other “D” word — Discretion. But with
that discretion comes responsibility. I have referenced earlier in this
article the enhancement by the Supreme Court of the gatekeeper’s
function in the last decade. To me, this modified Garofoli is a further
indication that the trial judge carries the integrity of the criminal justice
system on their shoulders. So much so, that just as Newton has “seen
further ... by standing on the shoulders of giants”,105 trial judges raise the
public confidence in the criminal justice system to the highest level.
They are foundational to our justice system.
Context appears to rule in the rule of law. Context is important as
rules should not be created in a vacuum. In the end, law cannot be wholly
theoretical, or it fails to provide guidance. However, contextual analyses
beget different world views and serve to underline the differences as
opposed to the similarities. True, the Vice Media decision is unanimous
in the result but worlds apart in the manner in which the decision-makers
arrived there. Maybe this is another new reality we must accept as we
jangle and jostle our way through the ever-changing urban legal
landscape. Maybe we need to embrace context and loosen our grip on the
hard edges of legal principles. Or maybe we won’t. And that is the beauty
of context — it truly is in the eye of the beholder.
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THE FINAL WORD

Although the Charter does not have the primary position in this Vice
Media narrative, it is present and accounted for, engaging the Court in a
dialogue on what is, in essence, the primary goal of the Charter, which is
to help create a normative vision of Canadian society. The Court in Vice
Media is divided between these visions but that may be in and of itself an
accurate reflection of Canadian society. Regardless, the true impact of
Vice Media may not be fully realized until the changes brought in by the
Journalistic Sources Protection Act106 are finally tested in court. Despite
Moldaver J.’s view that this legislation “enhances”107 journalistic source
protections, the question still remains whether these new amendments
will change our Charter relationship with the media.
A plain reading of the new amendments suggests we are indeed
changing our perception of media as journalists become the New Age
embodiment of the quintessential hunter-gatherer by pushing out
information to the hungry Internet-based masses. Accordingly, the judge
issuing a production order must now weigh the public interest in
investigating and prosecuting an offence against “the journalist’s right to
privacy in gathering and disseminating information” under section
488.01(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, promoting section 8 Charter rights to
a more prominent position. The law provides a further safeguard or
“safety valve”, through section 39.1 of the Canada Evidence Act,
protecting journalistic material when potentially used in court. There, the
judge weighs the public interest in the administration of justice against
the public interest in preserving the confidentiality in light of a number
of factors including “freedom of the press”. The new amendments on a
certain level do reflect the concerns distilled from the Vice Media
decision. Yet, the changes provide only incremental change. The pressing
issue still raised and not erased by Vice Media is the normative value of
these changes as discussed in this article. We can tolerate competing
visions, but we cannot live by them. In the end, the Court will need to
decide on which side of the bright line the media resides.108
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The Vice Media analysis has taken us through the deepness of
criminal law by way of the back-door of the noisy newsroom. The
decision, far from moot, provides a revealing glimpse into the future of
criminal law and the Supreme Court’s willingness to take a broad view of
those legal principles, which run, like a thread, through criminal law.
Principles engaging criminal procedure, evidence and the Charter may
not appear to be uniquely engaged in Supreme Court jurisprudence but,
as with all decisions, it is not in the making of the case but in the reading
of it that marks this decision from other ones. It is the manner in which
the Court arrives at the majority and concurring decisions, which
suggests more than it maintains. Vice Media is a game-changer as the
decision appears at a watershed moment when the Charter appears to ebb
and flow in the background of a case based in everyday issues of
information and how we access it. If context is everything then
information is the commodity upon which everything is based. It is this
visionary aspect of Vice Media which will live on in further decisions.

but does not expand on the normative quality required of the freedom of the press in assessing
disclosure under s. 39.1.

